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LONG V. LONG: LAW COURT RULING CHANGES
THE DISPOSITION OF JOINT REAL PROPERTY
ON DIVORCE
I. INTRODUCrION
In Long v. Long' the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, affirmed a district court divorce decree dividing the parties'
residence of thirteen years as marital property,' even though the majority
of the funds used for its purchase were traceable to non-marital property
the husband had acquired prior to the marriage.3 The governing statute
instructed the district court to make an "equitable" disposition of all pro-
perty acquired by the spouses during marriage, but required that it first
"set apart to each spouse the spouse's [separate] property," including
property acquired during marriage by a spouse "in exchange for property
[he] acquired prior to the marriage."4 The issue in Long was whether
1. 1997 ME 171,697 A.2d 1317.
2. Marital property is statutorily defined. It consists ofproperty in which both spouses have
an ownership right, regardless of who holds title. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(2), (3)
(West 1998). A helpful way of conceptualizing the property classifications that exist in marriage
is to think of them as three in number. the two separate estates and the marital estate or, plainly
speaking, yours, mine, and ours.
3. See Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171, H 1, 2,697 A.2d at 1319.
4. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(1) & (2)(B) (West 1998) (formerly Ma, REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (West 1981)). Title 19-A, section 953(l)-(5), (9) provides:
§ 953. Disposition of property
1. Disposition. In a proceeding for a divorce, for legal separation, or for disposition
of property following dissolution of the marriage by a court that lacked personaljuris-
diction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the
court shall set apart to each spouse the spouse's property and shall divide the marital
property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors,
including:.
A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property,
including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker,
B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the
family home or the right to live in the home for reasonable periods to the
spouse having custody of the children.
2. Definition. For purposes of this section, "marital property" means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except:
A. Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
B. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage
or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
C. Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
D. Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
E. The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
3. Acquired subsequent to marriage. All property acquired by either spouse
subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed
to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the
spouses in some form of coownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
tenancy by the entirety or community property. The presumption of marital
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jointly owned real property acquired during marriage with a mix of
marital and non-marital funds is subject in its entirety to division as
marital property or whether that part of it traceable to contributions of
non-marital funds must be set aside as the separate property of the
contributing spouse The Law Court held that where a spouse
contributes his separate, premarital property toward the acquisition of
jointly held real property, the district court must treat the joint property,
for purposes of disposition, as the property of the marital estate, and may
not set apart the property, or a portion thereof, as the non-marital
property of the contributing spouse.6
This ruling overturned nearly two decades of precedent. In 1979 the
Law Court held in Tibbetts v. Tibbetts that the instruction of the gover-
ning statute to "set apart to each spouse" property "acquired in exchange
for property acquired prior to the marriage" must be understood as re-
quiring the court to set aside for a spouse that portion of property that
could be traced back to a contribution of his non-marital property.7 This
rule is known as the "source of funds rule: 8 Long thus carved out an ex-
ception to the source of funds rule established in Tibbetms specifically for
real property acquired by spouses as joint tenants. 9 The Law Court
claimed that its decision to limit the application of the source of funds
rule as it applies to joint real property accomplished primarily four
goals: (a) ending the "conflicting and inequitable results" of
inconsistently recognizing "the legal significance of joint ownership" in
Maine's precedents; (b) "providing greater certainty and clearer
guidance to litigants, family law practitioners, and trial courts"; (c)
property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method
listed in subsection 2.
4. Disposition of marital property. If both parties to a divore action also request
the court in writing to order disposition of marital property acquired by eithe or
both of the parties to the divorce prior to January 1. 1972 or nonmarital property
owned by the parties to the divorce action, the court shall also orde disposition in
acordance with subsection 1.
5. Decree contents. If the final divorce decree disposes of real property, it must
name the party or parties responsible for preparing and recording the d=ce of
divorce or abstract of the decree and paying the rording fee afe th dik has
prepared or approved the abstract. The decree may nnme different parties to be
responsible for different parcels....
9. Omitted property. If a final divorcedecreefails toset apart ordivid marital
property overwhich the court had jurisdiction, the omitted property is deemed held
by both parties as tenants in common. On the motion of either party. the court
may set aside or divide the omitted property betw= the parties, as justice may
require
5. See Long v. Long. 1997 ME 171, 1, 697 A2d at 1319.
6. See id.
7. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70.75 (Me. 1979).
8. See id.
9. See Longv. Long. 1997 ME 171,116.697 A2d at 1324 ("We overrule the Young and
7-bbeas line of cases to the extent that they treatjointly owned real property as separate property.").
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achievingthe underlying purposes of "the statutory, scheme"; and (d)
"effectuat[ing] the reasonable expectations of wives and husbands
acquiring jointly owned property."' 0
This Note presents the legal background of the Long decision and
evaluates the change Long will effect in the future application of title 19-
A, section 953 of the Maine Revised Statutes.1 This Note addresses the
likely effectiveness of the Long ruling for achieving the court's stated
goals as well as the usefulness of the rule for advancing the development
in Maine of a fairer divorce law. This Note concludes that: (a) Long
mitigates, but does not end, the inconsistent recognition of the legal
significance of joint ownership, (b) it provides less certainty, not more,
to litigants, practitioners, and the courts, but (c) it is more in tune with
the statutory scheme and (d) it must be understood as effectuating the
reasonable expectations of married joint tenants. In the process, this
Note discusses some of the broader concerns that factor into an equitable
disposition of property-broader, in any event, than merely resolving the
"inconsistent [recognition of) the legal significance of joint ownership ' 2
and the other consequences of Long enumerated by the Law Court. 3
This Note ends with a legislative recommendation encouraging a partial
revision of title 19-A, section 953 in order to clarify its language and
incorporate the court's ruling in Long respecting joint property, and with
an argument in favor of a more fundamental redefinition of marital
property so as to better insure that the interest of the marital estate is
fully recognized in property dispositions pursuant to divorce.
10. Id. 6,697A.2dat 1320.
11. Shortly after Long was decided, title 19-A became effective and supplanted title 19.
While Long was decided under section 722-A of title 19, all citations in this Note are to the
substantially identical provisions of title 19-A, section 953.
12. Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171, [6, 697 A.2d at 1320.
13. For instance, the amount of discretion allowed Maine district courts over property held
by spouses, separately or jointly, will have significant impact on the ability of the courts to ensure
adequate support for dependent children and spouses following divorce through one-time property
division, thereby lessening dependence on periodic support payrments. For more on the desirability
of avoiding alimony through one-time property division so as to prevent "continued financial
interaction between the parties," see Berry v. Berry, 658 A.2d 1097, 1099 (Me. 1995). As noted
by Maine District Court Judge John C. Sheldon, "the literature on alimony reveals a furions, nation-
wide debate on the subject." John C. Sheldon, The Sleepwalker's Tour of Divorce Law, 48 ME. L
REV. 7, 26 (1996). Though clearly related to the disposition of property on divorce, the issue of
alimony is not addressed in this Note because it was not at issue in Long. For a view of the
nationwide debate as it exists at the local level, see id. at 26 (questioning the justfication and need
for alimony in the modern era); Laurie C. Kadoch, Five Degrees of Separation: A Response to
Judge Sheldon's The Sleepwalker's Tour of Divorce Law, 49 ME. L REV. 321,353 (arguing that
changes in divorce law should be the product of a "social dialogue" involving "the community, the
legislature, and the courts," rather than judicial discretion). Kadoch's primary issue of contention
with Sheldon's article concerns the appropriate process of legal change. See id at 322-23. She
does not, however, provide a principled argument in favor of alimony.
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IL BAcKGROUND
A. The Maine Marital Property Act
Maine first adopted the Maine Marital Property Act in 1971 under the
title "An Act Relating to the Division of Real and Personal Property by
the Court under a Decree of Divorce: 14 With the passage of the Act,
Maine joined an increasing number of states adopting the provisions of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (Uniform Act) and leaving
behind inequitable common-law divorce systems that focused on status
of title and determinations of fault for the division of marital property.15
The Maine Act, an adoption of section 307 of the Uniform Act, 'ended
14. P.1- 1971,ch.399, § 2. Seesupra note4 forthelanguageofthesttute.
15. See Comment, 7he Maine Marital PropeMtyAct: The Duties of Divorce Courts and the
Right to an Equitable Share of Marital Assets, 31 M&. L REV. 333, 334-37 (1980); UNt.
MARRiAGEAND DIVORCEAcr (amended 1973),9AU.LA. 147 (1987). Maine's adoption of the
Uniform Act was not comprehensive. The Maine Act represents an adoption of ection 307 of the
Uniform Act only, and in truncated frm. See ME. REV. STAT. AN. tit. 19-A, § 953 (West 1998);
UNE'. MRAGE AND DsVORCn Acr § 307, 9A U.LA. at 240. The Mainke Legslatue cho=e not
to ent the fifteen related sections, leaving it to Maine's courts to reslve Whr definitional and
constructional gaps might arise. See Comment, supra, at 334-37. The legislative history of the
Maine Act does not reveal why Maine did not adopt the additional provisions.
TIe Maine Act replaced rules ofproperty disposition, rooted in the common law, Which had been
codified in 1961. See ML. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 19, § 721 (West 1961) (repeaed 1997); ME. REV.
STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 723 (West 1961) (repealed 1971). Under the common law, "the spouse
without title was not entitled to any of the property on divorce and was left with only the uncertain
support of alimony." Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Me. 1980). The spouve determined
to be at fault in a divorce would surrender a one third interest in all real estate in which he or she
was seized during coveture. See Leavitt v. Tasker, 107 Me. 33. 35, 76 A. 953. 955 (1910).
"Cowae" is defined as the "condition or state of a mranied woman" charcterized by "the legal
disability which formerly existed at common law... whereby the wife could not ovm property free
from the husband's claim or controL"" BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 366 (6th ed. 1990). As one
commentator noted. "*he common law institutions can have the anomalous result of providing a
widow who has married a wealthy husband a few weeks before his death with a windfall, but
leaving a wife of thirty years standing penn iess." Richard W. Bart, Yours, Mine and
Ours-Separate Tde and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L REV. 379,379 (1969). State adoption
of Manied Woman's Property Acts brought an end to covetmre Maine first adopted the Married
Woman's Property Act through PL. 1844, ch. 117, § 2, which provided that, "when any woman
possessed of property, real or personal, shall many, such property shall continue to her
notwithstanding her coverture, and she shall have, hold and possess the same, as her eparate
property, exempt from any liability for the debts or contraets of the husbnd." See aLlo. e.g.,
Haggett v. Hurley, 91 Me. 542,40 A. 561 (1898); Allen v. Hooper. 50 Me. 371 (1862); Southard
v. Plummer, 36 Me. 64 (1853).
16. In 1971, at the time of Maine's adoption of section 307 of the Uniform Act, the
commissioners in charge 6f the Uniform Act had promulgated only one version of section 307.
Subsequently, in 1973, the commissioners amended the Uniform Act and provided two alternative
provisions. Alternatihe A. "recommended generally for adopdon," makes available for the court's
distribution all property held by either spouse or both spouses together, howeer acquired. See
UN.MARRiAGADDIvoR Acr § 307, 9A U.LA. at 238-39. Alternathe B, which was mo
in line with the original version adopted by Maine, limits the funds to be redistributed at divorce
to the marital acquests, as opposed to all property. See id. at 239. The commissioers offered
Alternative B for those community property states unwilling to do away with their long-standing
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the common-law concept of property ownership within the marital union
by establishing a presumption that property acquired during marriage by
either spouse is marital property, property in which both spouses have
an ownership right, regardless of who holds title." The new
presumption reflected a shift for Maine, and other common-law
jurisdictions which adopted the Uniform Act, toward an understanding
of marriage as a partnership in which spouses contribute their separate
abilities and resources toward the common good. Making the couple's
acquests during marriage the property of the marital partnership was not
a novel idea. The concept had long been at work in this country in
community property jurisdictions, which took their property law from
the Spanish and the French."
The presumption of marital property found in the Maine Act is subject
to certain defined excepti6ns, among them that property acquired by an
individual spouse "by gift, bequest, devise or descent" and "[piroperty
acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in
exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent" is to
be excluded from the marital estate. 9 The spouse having ownership of
property falling under one of the exceptions retains sole ownership in
such property." In essence, the definition of marital property that the
limitation of the divorce courts' authority to divide only the community, and not the separate, assets.
See id § 307 Cmt, 9A U.A. at 239-40; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FAMILY LAW 227-28 (1989). Compare the Maine Act with section 307, Alternative A, of the
Uniform Act, the alternative form favored by the commission for adoption:
§ 307. [Disposition of Property]
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage ... the court, without regard to
marital misconduct, shall ... finally equitably apportion between the parties the
property and assets belonging to either or both however and whenever acquired, and
whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In making
apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and prior
marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station,
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate,
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the
apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each
for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the
contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation,
or appreciation in value of the respective dstates, and the contribution of a spouse as
a homemaker or to the family unit.
(b) In a proceeding, the court may protect and promote the best interests of the
children by setting aside a portion of the jointly and separately held estates of the
parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, and the
general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent children of the parties.
UNIF. MARRAGE AND DIVORcE ACT § 307, 9A UJA. at 238-39.
17. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A. § 953(2), (3) (West 1998).
18. See Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr, Comment, Origin and Historical Development of the
Community Property System 25 LA. L REv. 78, 84-87 (1964). Scholars have traced the origin of
community property back more than four thousand years to Greece, Babylonia. and Egypt. See id
at 78.
19. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(2)(A), (B).
20. See id. § 953(l).
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statute provides is a negative one: it amounts to all property that is not
defined as the separate property of a spouse under subsection 2.
Upon divorce, the process utilized by Maine courts in dividing
property is as follows: (1) the court determines what of the parties'
properties is marital and what is non-maritaL including the contributions
each may have made to the acquisition of the marital property, and
recognizing the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker, (2) the court
sets apart to each that spouse's non-marital property; and (3) the court
divides the marital property between them in such proportion as the
court deems just2 To determine the just division of the marital
property, the statute instructs the court to consider "all relevant
factors." The statute lists only three required considerations: (A) the
relative "contribution" of each party, "including the contribution of a
spouse as homemaker," toward the acquisition of marital property; (B)
the value a spouse's non-marital property; and (C) the "economic
circumstance" a spouse will be left in upon finalization of the divorce,
including "the desirability of awarding the family home... to the spouse
having custody of the children." The statute ascribes no weight to any
particular consideration, nor does it limit the court's ability to consider
other factors?'
21. See Grdshmnnv. G(shman,407 A2d 9,11 OMe. 1979). Though the pardes to adivoce
may succeed in reacbing aprivate agreertrespecting the disposition of their property. Mine law
requires ajudicial hearing before the tmnination of the marriage. See ML R. CIV. P. 80(0. One
commentaor on Rule 80 has characterized this requiremnt as "a tiom-casutming charad" in cases
where it is applied to uncontested divorce cases. See Sheldon, supra note 13. at 16 (arguing that
Rule 80 should be amended "to drop the need for a hearing in uncontested divorces"). But see
Kadoch, supra note 13, at 335 (arguing that "unsuspecting couples are signing setrlemtnt
agreements without fully understanding possible future ramifications of th tm of their cantral.
22. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(1).
23. Id. From the perspective of common-law tradition, the recognition of the economic
value of a homemaker's contribution was as gmundbrenlng as the recognition ofth:h- sbtdintest
in property acquired during marriage. T economic value of such contributions should be evident
to most readers.
24. Itis noteworthy that the Maine Legislature, upon adopting the Maine Act, omitted the
language "without regard to marital misconduct" found in section 307 of the Uniform Act
Whether, and to what extent, fault remains a relevant factor to consider in a disposition of
property remains an open question. See Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356, 135$ (1980). In Boyd, the
court commented on the omission of the "without regard to marital miscnduct" langua&=
The Maine disposition of property statute was based on an act with the stated pmpoe
of dimiating th entire concetual structure of divorcebased on alt. It is cle from
the enumerated "ielevant factors" in Section 722-A(l) that the primary emphasis is
economic- present economic circumstances and past contributions to the marriage.
either financial or translatable into financial terms, such as the contribution of a spouse
as homemak At most, the Legislature may hav e hesitated to absolutely preclu& the
court from considering "marfital misconduct" in the division of marital property vde
the "marital misconduct" was of a financial nature. We intimat no opinion as to
whether a court has discretion to consider marital misconduct in th: disposition of
marital property when the misconduct has had an economic inact. eg., nonsupport or
gift from the marital estate to a paramour.
ld. (citation omitted).
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The issue that the Long court faced, and that this Note addresses, con-
cerns step one of the statutory scheme outlined above: the determination
of what property is separate and what property is marital. Subsections
2 and 3 of the Maine Act govern the process of separating the non-
marital property from the marital property. Subsection 3 provides that
"[a]ll property acquired by either spouse [during marriage] is presumed
to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or
by the spouses in some form of coownership .... I This presumption
of marital property "is overcome" if the property at issue falls under an
exception in subsection 2. Subsection 2 lists five types of property that
are excluded from the definition of marital property:
A. Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
B. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired
prior to the marriage or in exchange for property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
C. Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal
separation;
D. Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
E. The increase in value of property acquired prior to the
marriage.2
The brief enumeration of factors to be considered in the disposition of property in divorce is
striking when compared to the lengthy list of factors that are to be considered in the determination
of an award of spousal support (formerly known as alimony):
1. Factors. The court shall consider the following factors when determining an award
of spousal support:
A. The length of the marriage;
B. The ability of each party to pay;
C. The age of each party;,
D. The employment history and employment potential of each party;
E. The income history and income potential of each party;,
F. The education and training of each party;
G. The provisions for retirement and health insurance benefits of each party;,
FL The tax consequences of the division of marital property, including the tax
consequences of the sale of the marital home, if applicable;
L The health and disabilities of each party;,
J. The tax consequences of a spousal support award;
K The contributions ofeitherparty as homemaker;,
L. The contributions of either party to the education or earning potential of the
other party;,
M. Economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital
property or income;
N. The standard of living of the parties during the marriage; and
0. Any other factors the court considers appropriate.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 951. It is difficult to understand why, in particular, the duration
of the marriage, the earning potential of the partners, the tax consequences of the decision, and the
educational factors are considered a significant factor in spousal support but not in the disposition
of property.
25. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(3).
26. Id § 953(2).
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Subsection 2(B) excludes from the marital estate property "acquired
in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage." z In other
words, the exclusion in 2(B) allows a spouse to sell, modify, trade, or
otherwise exchange non-marital property without forfeiting an interest
in it to the marital estate. A spouse owning separate property is not
required to hold that property dormant in order to maintain separate
ownership. Even where a spouse sells non-marital property that has
appreciated in value, subsection 2(E) allows the capital gain from that
exchange to be kept as non-marital property by the selling spouse. 3
Though seemingly straightforward, the language of subsection 2(B)
provides uncertain guidance in the circumstance where a spouse con-
tributes non-marital property toward the acquisition of new property
taken by both spouses in joint tenancy. Under the common law, taking
title in joint tenancy is treated as conferring equal ownership in both
joint tenants. 9 However, subsection 3 provides that all property
acquired during marriage is, upon divorce, "presumed to be marital
property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses
in some form of coownership such as joint tenancy."'  The only
exceptions to the subsection 3 presumption of marital property are those
-covered in subsection 2?3 Thus, upon divorce, there are really only two
kinds of property ownership for a divorce court to address: separate
ownership and marital ownership. All the same, considerations of the
legal significance of joint title have been at the crux of judicial treatment
of the statute.
Another interpretive problem with the statute is the meaning to be
given to the phrase "acquired in exchange" in subsection 2(B).
Confusion arises in the situation where a spouse has contributed non-
marital property toward the partial acquisition of new property. Put
another way, it is the situation where a couple acquires new property and
gives in exchange a mix of marital and non-marital property, often
referred to as a commingling of assets. The question is whether the
partial contribution of non-marital property is to be given the same effect
that a contribution of the entire exchange price would be given. If
"acquired in exchange" is construed to mean only the full acquisition of
title in new property through exchange of non-marital property, without
any contribution of marital property, then contributions of non-marital
property that satisfy only a portion of the purchase price will likely be
treated as gifts to the marital estate and not be recoverable by the
contributing spouse as his or her separate property. On the other hand,
if "acquired in exchange" is understood to include the acquisition of a
proportional interest in property, then a spouse who contributes non-
27. Id. § 953(2)(B).
28. Id. § 953(2)(E).
29. See Commet supmra note 15, at 338.
30. ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A. § 953(3).
31. See id § 953(2).
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marital property toward the partial acquisition of new property should
be able to extract as separate property the value of that contribution at
the time of divorce, even if title is in joint tenancy. Whatever value
might remain in property acquired through such a mix of assets would
belong to the marital estate.
B. Judicial Construction of Subsections 2 and 3 of the Maine Act
The Law Court first encountered the latent interpretive problem in
title 19, section 722-A (now title 19-A, section 953) in 1974 in Young v.
Young.32 In Young, the husband and wife contributed funds acquired
individually and prior to marriage for the purchase of their new home,
financing the balance with a home mortgage loan-and taking title as joint
tenants. Mr. Young contributed $11,765 and Mrs. Young contributed
$500 toward the purchase.33 Seventeen months after marriage, Mrs.
Young instituted an action for divorce. In its divorce decree, the
superior court applied section 722-A and ordered that the home be sold
and the proceeds divided equally between Mr. and Mrs. Young.' On
appeal, the husband argued that the language of subsection 2 had been
contravened, that his $11,765 investment in the property should be set
aside as his separate estate because it was acquired in exchange for
property he had acquired prior to the marriage." The wife, on the other
hand, urged the court to adopt the principle of "transmutation" as a way
of interpreting section 722-A.36 Under this doctrine, an exercise of
"actual intention objectively manifested" may serve to transmute non-
marital property into marital property. 7 Mrs. Young contended that a
conveyance in joint tenancy should be presumed to constitute an
objective manifestation of each spouse's intent to "transmute" his or her
property into the marital estate."8 In ruling for the husband, the Law
Court sidestepped entirely the question of the proper construction of the
statute because of a technicality: the conveyance that transferred the
property to the couple had been recorded prior to the effective date of
the Act.39 Because the transfer occurred before the concept of marital
property was recognized in Maine, it was impossible, the court reasoned,
for the husband to have objectively intended to transmute his property
into the marital estate.'
32. 329 A.2d 386 (Me. 1974).
33. See id. at387.
34. See id. at 387-88. -
35. See id. at 388.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 389; see also Corment, supra note 15, at 348.
38. See Young v. Young, 329 A.2d at 389.
39. See id. at 390.
40. See id.
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Such an easy out was not available in 1979 when the issue reappeared
in Tibbetts v. Tibbetts4  The Tibbetts court was required toconstrue the
statutory language "acquired in exchange for" in subsection 2(B). In
Tibbetts, the wife contributed $5000 she acquired prior to marriage to-
ward the purchase of property taken in joint tenancy during the couple's
marriage.s The superior court interpreted subsection 2(B) to mean that,
because the wife had contributed $5000 in non-marital funds toward its
purchase, the entire property was therefore non-marital.' On appeal, the
Law Court overruled this interpretation, observing that it was illogical
to conclude that because the statutory language excluded property
"acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage" an
entire property must be set aside where only a portion of it was acquired
in exchange for non-marital funds&" The court stated that the "crux of
the interpretive problem" at issue was the "application and meaning of
the words 'acquired in exchange for' found in subsection 2(3) of the
Maine Act.45 The court determined that the 'Tundamental purposes" of
the statute as "originally promulgated" required it to adopt a "dynamic
interpretation of the term 'acquisition"' rather than a static
interpretationO Thus, the court held that "acquisition" was an ongoing
process not limited to the moment when the title in property is
transferred. The court explained:
[PIroperty is non-marital to the extent that it was acquired in exchange
for property acquired prior to marriage. Thus a single item of
property may be to some extent non-marital and the remainder
marital. Accordingly, where property is acquired in exchange for
both marital property and non-marital property, the portion
attributable to each must be determined. That portion of the property
acquired in exchange for non-marital property must then be "set
apart" as directed by 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(1)."
41. 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979).
42. See id. at 73.
43. See id. at 74.
44. See id.
45. 1d
46. Id.at75-76. In support of this interpretation see UNF. MAtRRIA AMDIVORCE ACr
§ 307 cmt, 9A ULA. 147, 239-40 (1987); 1971 Midyear Report and Recomddadian of The
Famriy Law Section to the ABA House of Delegates on the Uniforn Marriage and Divorce AcL 5
FAM.LQ. 133, 138 (1971).
47. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at75. The court provided the following illustratio
For $20,000 a husband and wife acquir a parcel of real estate. A down payiZ of
S5,000 is contributed by the wife from property acquired prior to the marriage and the
remaining $15,000 is financed through crediL One-quarter of tha parcel is the: ifes
non-marital property. If the property appreciates in value to S30,000 and the parties
contribute an additional $5,000 of marital property-towad its pumar the following
division would be required One-quarter of thz value of the parcel or $7,500 is
non-marital property to be set apart to the wife. Assuming a remining mortgge of
S10,000, since $10,000 in total has been contributed toward purchaseoftheparcel
19981
MAINE LA W REVIEW
Under this construction, the marital interest in property acquired with
a mix of assets amounts to that portion of the estate not acquired through
the exchange of non-marital assets. In adopting the source of funds
rule, the court recognized that it was making an equitable exception to
the inception of title rule, which characterizes property at divorce as
either separate or marital based on the state of the title when it was first
taken, even where marital assets are expended on improvements,
maintenance, or toward purchase.49 Under the inception of title rule, a
spouse acquiring title to property prior to marriage without satisfying the
entire purchase price would maintain sole title in the property after
marriage even though the balance of the purchase price was paid after
marriage with marital funds.5
The soutce of funds exception was warranted, the court stated, given
that the statute, based upon the Uniform Act, was founded upon a
partnership theory of marriage 5 ' The equity of the exception lay in its
assurance that inception of title considerations would not prevent a
spouse from recovering his or her fair, pro tanto interest in the overall
estate?' The court recognized that tracing the relative contributions of
the separate and marital estates back to their source would involve
problems of proof and complicated anal),ses of relative equity interests,
but concluded that "in fairness to both spouses 'acquisition' must not
arbitrarily and finally be fixed on the date that a legal obligation to
purchase is created." Though the pure inception of title rule was far
simpler to apply, the source of funds doctrine provided "the flexibility
needed to achieve the equitable result sought by the drafters of the
Uniform Act's property division provisions." As essentially equitable
principles, the provisions of the Uniform Act were designed to bring an
end to pure considerations of legal title in the disposition of property on
divorce. For instance, just as sole title in one spouse should not
foreclose the marital estate---and by extension the non-titled
spouse-from accruing interest in a piece of property over time, joint
title in both spouses should not foreclose the individual spouse from
maintaining his private, non-marital interest.5
valued initially at $20,000, there will remainan equity of $12,500 of marital property
to be divided.
Id. at 75 n.5.
48. See id
49. See id at 76. The Tbbets court recognized that with its adoption of the source of funds
rule it was joining a minority of jurisdictions, but believed the rule offered "a more flexible and
more equitable approach." l
50. Id.
51. See id. at 77. -
52. See id
53. Id.
54. Comment, supra note 15, at 348.
55. For similar treatmrent see Cain v. Cain, 536 $.W.2d 866, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
Consider also that the equitable powers of the court allow it to reshape legal title when necessary
to ensure equity. Thus, rather than forcing the sale of property held by a couple in joint tenancy,
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It did not take long for this clear statement of policy to become
muddied. In the 1980 case of Carter v. Carter,6 the court had to deter-
mine the proper disposition of property that the husband had acquired
prior to marriage, and had held sole title to, but which he had since
reconveyed to himself and his wife as joint tenants.7 The wife in
Carter, like the wife in Young, sought to persuade the court to adopt the
transmutation doctrine and treat the husband's transfer of property into
joint tenancy as manifesting the husband's intent to make a donative
transfer to the wife of one half of his interest. Because her interest
would thus be one "acquired by gift," she reasoned, the court would be
required to set her interest aside as her separate property? In support
of this argument, she cited the Maine common-law case of Greenburg
v. Greenburg,59 which held that such transfers must be presumed to
constitute a gift to the grantee. ° The husband countered by arguing that
the property must be set aside as his separate property pursuant to
subsection 2(B) and the Tibbetts source of ftmds rule because the current
title in joint tenancy was "acquired in exchange for property acquired
prior to the marriage" Moreover, he countered his wife's argument for
the presumption of donative intent with the argument that the transfer
into joint tenancy was, in fact, only evidence of the couple's intent to
avoid probate and estate taxes.
The court was not moved by either of the husband's arguments.
Instead, following a line of reasoning used by the Missouri Court of
Appeals in a similar case, the court held that the property was part of
the marital estate because the transfer into joint tenancy 'must be
understood as evidencing an intention to transfer the property to the
marital estate.!' The Carter court reasoned that the source of funds rule
would work an injustice in this circumstance because
a divorce court also has discretion to transfnrm the couples legal interest into a tenancy in common,
with a life estate in one spouse, thus enabling a dependent to maintain his or her residece. See
Bryant v. Bryant 411 A.2d 391,393 (Me. 1980);Tibbetts v. Tibbetts 406 A.2d at77 r.l. Indeed
it is noteworthy that the divorce decre "may divest title and itself act as the con-eyancing
instrument." Comenat, spra note 15, at 351; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(7) (West
1998).
56. 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980).
57. See a at 1020.
58. See id.
59. 141 Me. 320,43 A.2d 841 (1945).
60. See id.at 322,43 A.2d at 842.
61. MF. REv. SrAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(2)(B) (West 1998); see Cter v. Crte 419 A.2d
at 1020.
62. See Carterv. Carter, 419 A2d at 1020. Real estate practitionertgeacrlly do gh such
advice to their clients. The great benefit in holding real estae in joint tnanc is in the right of
survivorship--thz last surviving teaant takes the property as sole ovter without any formal transfe
ofinterest, thus freeing the property from the publicity and expense of pbate procedings. See
7 RrcHA.D R. Powtts., PowE.. ON REAL PROPRTY, ch. 51. U 615.617 (1997).
63. See Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. C. App. 1975).
64. Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d at 1022.
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it would mean that a spouse owning property prior to the marriage
could exchange that property, place such exchanged property in joint
names and after many years of happy marriage, defeat the right of the
other spouse in such property with the result that the other spouse
would have no interest whatsoever in the property held in joint
names.
65
Based on this claim, the Carter court held that a transfer from one
spouse to both in joint tenancy must be understood as an intentional
transfer of the property to the marital estate and not to the grantee
spouse.' Thus with Carter Maine acquired two rules. On the one hand,
property "dynamically" acquired in exchange for premarital property
would still be divided so as to reflect the individual contributions of non-
marital property, irrespective of joint title. On the other hand, property
acquired entirely by one spouse would be considered marital property if
it had later been transferred into joint tenancy during the marriage.
The 1990 decision of Dubord v. Dubord ' provided another variation
that further stymied the emergence of a clear, concise rule. In Dubord,
the wife contributed $10,000 of her non-marital funds in order to speed
the retirement of a mortgage on the couple's first home and another
$20,000 in non-marital funds to secure the down payment on a second
home." Both properties were held in joint tenancy. The Dubord court
rejected the husband's Carter argument that, because his wife took the
second home as ajoint tenant with him, she intended to make a donative
transfer of the $20,000 to the marital estate.69 The court distinguished
Carter because there one spouse, who had acquired the property prior to
marriage, transferred it to- both spouses in joint tenancy during the
marriage.70 In rejecting the application of the Carter presumption of
donative intent, the court stated:
Were we to apply the Carter presumption to the present facts, we
would effectively abandon the source of funds rule and hold that the
mere act of taking property in joint names results in a gift to the
65. Id. at 1021 (quoting Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d at 622).
66. See id. The Carter court asserted that the justification for this rule arose out of the
partnership and shared entAs theory that underlay the Uniform Act. See i at 1022. Whether
this is true or not, the presumption of donative intent is a long recognized common-law rule. See
Greenburg v. Gxeenburg, 141 Me. 320,323,43 A.2d 841, 842 (1945). The difference is that under
the ommon-law rule joint tenancy mandates a one-half interest to each spouse. See i. Under the
Carter rule, however, the gift is to the marital estate rather than to the spouse. See Carter v. Carter,
419 A.2d at 1022. Because the donation is to the marital estate instead of the spouse, the divorce
court has the authority to divide the property along equitable grounds. See id. at 1023.
67. 579 A.2d 257 (Me. 1990).
68. See id. at 258-59.
69. See id. at 259.
70. See id. at 260.
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marital estate of any separate property used as part of the purchase
price. We refuse to do so!'
Thus, the source of funds rule established in Tibbetts determined the
outcome of Dubord. The Dubord court reinforced the notion found in
Tibbetts that equity requires more than a "mere" consideration of title in
the disposition of property in a divorce Suggestive of the firm footing
that the source of funds rule now had, the Dubord court expressly
limited the Carter presumption of donative intent to apply only to "an
interspousal transfer creating ajoint tenancy. ' Thus, absent a separate
interspousal transaction that evidenced a clear objective intent to confer
a joint interest in the contributing spouse's non-marital property, the
spouse contributing non-marital property would be allowed to recover
the value of that investment upon divorce. In essence, a couple would
have to affirmatively establish, through an interspousal transfer or other
evidence, that the contributing spouse was relinquishing his or her
ownership over separate property. This presumption would protect
spouses by allowing them to make contributions freely to the economic
unit, without jeopardizing their separate estates.
IL LONG V. LONG
Mary Long filed suit to divorce her husband, Richard, in June of
1993Y' In addition to seeking a ruling on the custody and support of two
minor children, the parties needed to resolve the disposition of the
family residence in Blanchard, Maine. Though the couple had
acquired the subject property during their marriage, Richard could trace
$35,000 of the $38,000 purchase price to the sale of a home he had
owned in Pennsylvania at the time he and Mary were married. 6 To
complicate matters slightly, however, the Pennsylvania property was still
under a mortgage at the time the couple married, and they lived in it
together for a time, during which they made the monthly mortgage
payments with marital funds. 7 After selling the Pennsylvania property,
to which Richard held sole title, for $38,234.38, Richard put $35,000 of
the proceeds into a joint savings account payable to both him and
Mary.? In December of 1979, they applied the $35,000 to the purchase
of their Maine residence, which they took as joint tenants Shortly
after purchasing the residence, the couple took out a $10,00 home
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See id. at 259.
73. Id. at 260 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943. 947 a.5 (1984)).
74. See Longv. Long, 1997 ME 171, 13, 697 A.2d 1317, 1319.
75. Seeid.
76. Seeid.12,697 A.2dat1319.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See iU.
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equity loan and commenced maldng monthly payments with marital
funds.80
At the time of their divorce, the Longs were able to agree that the
home was worth $47,500.1 Because a $3700 balance remained on the
home equity loan, the couple's equity in the property amounted to
$43,800.' The district court ruled that the entire property would be
disposed of as marital property because Richard had transferred the
funds from his Pennsylvania home into a joint account with Mary, thus
manifesting a gift to the marital estate.' As a result the court ruled that
the Longs purchased the Maine premises entirely with marital funds. 4
The court gave the residence to Richard, conditioning the disposition on
Richard's purchase of Mary's equity in the home, calculated at $21,900,
or half of the couple's equity."5 Richard appealed that judgment,
alleging error in the failure of the court to apply the source of funds rule
and for conditioning the disposition of the residence to him on an
"unreasonable timetable for purchasing Mary's equity."86 The superior
court affirmed the district court's ruling.
8 7
On further appeal, the Law Court unanimously affirmed the ruling and
overturned Young and Tibbetts "and their progeny," holding that "jointly
owned real property is subject to division as marital property pursuant
to 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A (1981), even though parts of it were acquired
with non-marital funds."88 The court appealed to the legislative intent
and partnership theory underlying the Maine Act to aid its construction
of the statutory language.89 The court determined that the text of the
statute could "shed no light" on the problem and that the partnership
theory could only be enhanced by treating all property acquired jointly
during marriage as marital property.' The court noted:
By recognizing the legal significance of joint ownership, we do not
resurrect the inflexibility and inequities of the prior law, nor do we
deviate from the text of the statute. By holding that joint ownership
results in marital property, we correct the interplay between
subsections 2 and 3 and advance the statutory purpose of subjecting
shared assets to the court's equitable powers of division.91
The court further supported its conclusion by noting that dividing
jointly held property as marital property would be consistent with the
80. See id.
81. See id. 3,697 A.2d at 1319.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id 13, 697 A.2dat 1319-20.
86. Id. 11,697 A.2d at 1319.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id. H 6-7, 697 A.2d at 1320.
90. Id 115, 697 A.2d at 1323.
91. Id. 117, 697 A.2d at 1324.
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fact that, during marriage, each spouse had rights to the joint property
that allowed him or her to effect an immediate transfer of his or her
interest. 2 The court could not determine why a spouse's surrender of
half ownership of property during marriage should be treated as though
it had failed to create divisible rights upon divorce?3 Moreover, it would
be inconsistent, reasoned the court, to allow consideration of
contributions to give the married joint tenant an ability to recapture
property rights at divorce that no other joint tenant would have in any
other context. 4 The court further noted:
Any unfairness pursuant to the new rule is addressed by the court's
consideration of all relevant factors, in dividing marital property,
including the length of the marriage and the relative contribution of
the spouses. Section 722-A relies on an equitable division rather than
an inflexible system of classification to achieve justice in complex
circumstances.0 5
W ith Long, then, the district courts have acquired additional authority
over the division of spousal property not previously allowed. The obility
of a spouse to trace back the acquisition of a partial interest in jointly
held property to an exchange of premarital, separate property will not
work to set apart the exchanged amount from the equitable discretion of
the divorce court. Instead, the entire jointly held property will be subject
to the court's equitable discretion to divide marital property under the
Maine Act. The divorce courts are still directed to take into
consideration the "contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
marital property" 5 in the course of determining what constitutes
equitable division, but that consideration will be weighed against other
important considerations which may diminish the relative significance
of the source of funds?
The Long court left certain questions unanswered. The narrow
holding of Long is that it overruled the "Young and Tibbets line of cases
to the extent that they treat jointly owned real property as separate
property."" Does this mean that the court rejected the "dynamic"
acquisition interpretation of the statutory language and that the source
of funds rule is still applicable to cases where ownership is other than
joint ownership? Is the divorce court still authorized to trace the source
of funds contributed by the marital estate toward the purchase price of
non-marital property, the circumstance for which the source of funds
rule of construction was originally designed?" Read strictly, Long
92. Seei U115, 697 A.2dat1323.
93. See id.16,697A.2dat1323.
94. See id. 16,697 A.2d-at 1323-24 (citing Boulette v. Boulette., 627 A.2d 1017, 1018
(Me. 1993)).
95. Id. 116,697 A.2d at 1324.
96. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(1) (West 1998).
97. See Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171, 1 16,697 A.2d at 1324.
98. Id.
99. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70.76 (Me. 1979).
19981
MAINE LAWREVIEW
seems to answer the latter question in the affirmative. Thus, the use of
the source of funds rule as an equitable exception to the inception of title
rule is apparently still an available option for Maine divorce courts.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Options Available to the Long Court
To begin an evaluation of the Law Court's ruling, it is important to
note that the facts of Long did not require the court to overturn the
source of funds rule. The court had at least two viable alternatives
available to it. One possible resolution would have been to apply the
presumption of donative intent for interspousal transfers in joint tenancy,
as established in Carter, -and maintain the status quo by leaving the
source of funds rule to apply to a narrower class of joint tenancy cases.
Like the course followed by the Long court, this would have resulted in
affirmance of the judgment of the lower court. Another option would
have been to apply the source of funds rule, overturn the Carter
presumption of donative intent for interspousal transfers in joint tenancy,
and reverse the district court's ruling with, perhaps, the inclusion of
some guidelines for separating property acquired with mixed assets
through the source of funds rule.
The first alternative suggested above would have been the easiest to
apply and would have avoided any rejection or limitation of precedent.
On the basis of its prior cases, the Long court could have simply
affirmed the district court's decree outright. In Carter, the Law Court
had already carved out an exception for interspousal transfers in joint
tenancy."° In Long, the husband had put all the proceeds from the sale
of his Pennsylvania home into a joint bank account. This act could have
triggered the Carter exception to the source of funds rule. In fact, that
is precisely the approach taken by the district court in Long.1°" Thus, the
Law Court could have summarily affirmed, maintained the source of
funds rule, and insured an identical outcome for the case.
The court also could have utilized the source of funds rule to resolve
the case. Recall that the rule was first adopted to assure that the marital
estate could recover all contributions of marital resources toward the
acquisition of new property during marriage, even where one spouse
held sole title."° Tracing the source of the contributions in Long would
result, initially, in the setting aside of $35,000 of the $43,800 home
value as Richard's separate property, leaving $8800 in marital property.
Because of the discretion granted to divorce courts by the Maine Marital
Property Act and the instruction to take into consideration the value of
property set apart as one spouse's non-marital property, the $8800 could
100. See Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980); supra text accompanying notes 56-66.
101. See Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171,13,697 A.2d at 1319.
102. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 76-77; Comment, supra note 15, at 346-48.
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very well go entirely to Mary. 3 The Longs, however, also took out a
home equity loan in the amount of $10,000."'4 Of this liability, $6300
was paid for with marital flmds, bringing the marital contribution toward
the home to a total of $15,100. Again, considering the divorce court's
discretion in dividing marital property, a reasonable outcome would be
$15,100 to Mary, leaving $28,700 for Richard. In other words, over
twenty years of marriage, Mary would acquire a $15,100 interest in the
marital residence with a minimal initial contribution," 5 while Richard
would lose $6300 over the same period from his initial investment of
$35,000. To some, such a resolution might appear to be equitable and
the product of a fair application of the statutory language. Perhaps the
strongest feature of such a resolution is that it would allow spouses some
assurance that a contribution of separate property toward acquisition of
new property, such as a marital residence, would be recoverable in the
event of a failed marriage. It would also guarantee to the marital estate
the ability to recover all contributions of marital resources by treating
the proportionate marital contribution toward "property acquired
[during] marriage," as marital property, a result fully consistent with
subsection 3 6 But to achieve this result in Long, the court would have
been forced to reexamine the Carter presumption of donative intent for
interspousal transfers in joint tenancy. Because Richard deposited the
proceeds from the sale of his Pennsylvania residence into a joint
account, suggestive of an interspousal transfer, the court would have
been forced to abandon the presumption of donative intent established
by the Carter court.
B. Resolving Inconsistencies in the Treatment of Joint Ownership
That the use of the source of funds rule in Long would have required
the abandonment of the Carter donative presumption supports the Long
court's assertion that the preexisting rules were based on inconsistent
treatment of the 'legal significance of joint ownership." o For the
7dibetts court, the source of funds rule would achieve equity precisely
because it allowed the court to disregard the form of legal title, whether
joint title, sole tide, or otherwise. On the other hand, the Carter court's
donative presumption for interspousal transfers in joint tenancy focused
on the form of title and the mode of title transfer in determining whether
property was to be treated as marital or not. The Young and Tibbeas line
of cases has produced a situation where one piece of jointly held
property might be treated as marital while another piece of jointly held
103. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(l) (West 1998).
104. See Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171, 2 697 A.2d at 1319.
105. Mary's initial economic contribution is not specified. It may have been nothing or it
mayhavebeen up to $3000. The record does not indicate the soure of $3000 that v6s applied to
the prchase. See id.
106. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19-A. § 953(3).
107. Long v. Long. 1997 ME 171, 1 6,697 A.2d at 1320.
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property might be treated as both marital and separate simply because of
the formalities surrounding the transfer of title. With Carter, an
interspousa transfer during marriage by one spouse to both spouses as
joint tenants came to have a different legal significance (inclusion in the
marital estate) than a partial contribution of separate property toward
acquisition of new property taken by the spouses as joint tenants (source
of funds tracing allowed). Why, after all, should the timing of the
transfer of title be of primary significance and the form of title of
secondary significance in the characterization of property ownership?
The "Young and Tibbetts line of cases" produced another inconsistency
in the legal significance of joint property."' 8 The Long court noted that
in all circumstances taking tile in joint tenancy confers on each joint
tenant property rights that are immediately transferable."° Thus, a
spouse holding property as ajoint tenant could freely transfer a one-half
interest to another person during marriage, irrespective of that spouse's
contribution toward the joint property. Yet, upon divorce, Tibbetts
allowed a married person to recapture what he or she had willingly
relinquished during marriage.' A married joint tenant thus received
preferential treatment, as compared with an unmarried joint tenant, if he
or she had contributed a majority of the purchase price of joint property.
Among the strongest features of the rule announced in Long is that it
lessens these several inconsistencies by making all joint property pre-
sumptively marital, a result in harmony with the language of subsection
3 of the Maine Act. The universal presumption that joint property is a
part of the marital estate handily dispatches with the tension between
Tibbetts and Carter. The joint tenancy created through an interspousal
transfer will now be of equal significance to a joint tenancy acquired by
the spouses with a mix of marital and non-marital property. The Long
ruling has a lesser impact, however, on the disparity in the treatment of
married versus unmarried joint tenants. Under Long, the married joint
tenant recovers an equitable share of joint property on divorce, whereas
the unmarried joint tenant recovers an equal share through partition.
The equitable disposition of property, by definition, does not promise the
married joint tenant an equal share in joint property. Equal division is
particularly unlikely under current law where there is a dependent
spouse or children who require support upon the termination of the
marriage and where the joint property, particularly if it is the marital
home, is the only asset of significant value held by the couple. In such
circumstances the married joint tenant will likely receive a greater or
lesser part of joint property than an unmarried joint tenant would receive
through partition.. On the other hand, because the Long rule allows the
108. Id.116,697A.2dat1324.
109. Seeid. 16,697A.2dat1323.
110. See id. 16,697 A.2d at 1324; see also Boulettev. Boulette, 627 A.2d 1017, 1018 (Me.
1993) (disallowing consideration of contributions in a partition action between unmaried joint
tenants).
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divorce court to consider such factors as the relative contribution of
spouses toward the acquisition of marital property, the divorce court is
able to divide joint property equally if appropriate.
One question that should be asked, which the Long court did not
address, is whether inconsistent treatment of married and unmarried joint
tenants is a cause for concern. If one answers yes to this question, it is
likely because one views the economic relationship of marital partners
as characterized by essentially dispassionate, arm's length transactions
(taking the analogy of the business partnership too far, perhaps). This
perspective is naive. Economic transactions between marital partners
are typically characterized by underlying emotional considerations,
rather than objective business considerations, and by forms of reliance
not found generally in transactions involving unmarried joint tenants,
except those in cases where the unmarried joint tenants are living as de
facto marital partners or where transactions are entered into between and
among family members. But the marriage relationship, essentially an
underlying contract between the parties, introduces unique factors. Most
fundamentally, the basic assumption on which marital partners rely when
entering into joint or interspousal transactions is that the marriage will
,endure.' The likelihood that defeated expectations and other reliance
factors will exist in the termination of a marriage supports the Long
court's decision to expand the equitable authority of the divorce court
over a greater portion of the spouses' total property holdings. In any
event, given that the equity aspect of proceedings involving the
disposition of property at divorce makes them fundamentally different
from property partition cases at law, the Long court's concern that a
married joint tenant would have different rights than any other joint
tenant is misplaced." 2
C. The Limitations of the Source of Funds Rule
The source of funds rule originated in community property
jurisdictions as an equitable exception to the inception of title rule.
111. The primary elements of marriage have been classified as intended duration, sexual
exclusivity, and social legitimacy. See G(EDON, sura note 16. at 11-12. Teb clemnt of intended
duration is, one might say, compromised to some xtet given the prevalence of divorce in Western
nations. See id. at 193. Moreo-,=, while the universal probhition on polygamy in the several states
reflects our strong cultural acceptance of sexual exclusivity during marriage, ther is no legal
consequence to entering into as many consecutive marriag-s as one vishts, even though prior
marriages mnay posesignificant burdens related to dt support of dependents. In Et thZ freedom
to many is a right that has gained constitational protection. See Zablockiv. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
386(1978). ProfessorGlendo nrefrs to this pencmmon as " "ri as opposed to "simultanous"
polygamy. See GLENDON, supra note 16, at 52-53.
112. With respect to the special weight divorce bears upon the effe t of legal arrangeents
made by spouses during marriage consider that the Maine Probate Code prevents a farner spousme
from remaining a beneficiary to a will created by the oth= spouse during marriage, though the
testao otherwise fails to amend the testamentar instrum nt See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tiL 1I8-A,
§ 2-508 (West 1998).
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Under the Spanish and Mexican civil law governing marriage and
divorce, on which numerous American jurisdictions base their
community property regimes,"' all property was either fully separate or
fully communal. Whatever property a man or woman brought into a
marriage was treated as his or her separate property during marriage,
even if community funds were later contributed toward improvements
or the satisfaction of obligations related to the purchase of the property.
One commentator notes:
Despite favoring community ownership, Spanish-Mex ican law had an
even stronger preference for unified ownership as expressed in the
"inception of title" doctrine. In most families the most significant
separate property asset was the family home and surrounding lands,
which the law sought to have pass generation by' generation to the
eldest son, always remaining in the blood line. If the family home
were even partly community rather than Husband's separate property,
half the community share would be owned at Husband's death by the
widow, who might remarry and give birth to a child not related to the
deceased husband who might in turn inherit a fractional ownership in
the "family" estate. For similar policy reasons... use of community
funds to build structures on or otherwise improve separately owned
land did not give the community an interest in the property. 114
As economic developments made this agrarian-based legal policy in-
creasingly outmoded, community property jurisdictions began develop-
ing exceptions that gradually eroded the inception of title doctrine.s
Among these doctrines was the source of funds rule, designed to reim-
burse the community for its contributions toward property held
separately by one spouse.'1
6
Though the source of funds rule originated as a method of
reimbursing the communal interest, in time it was used in some
jurisdictions as a means of objectively determining the "ratio of
community and separate investment in... property."'1 7 When so used,
the source of funds rule would appear to allow partners in marriage to
pool their individual, non-marital assets in order to acquire property
together that they could not acquire on their own, while preserving to
each the ability to recapture their non-marital property if the joint
venture should fail.
113. The American states having community property regimes based on French or Spanish
law are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. See
JE= DuKM & JAMES E. KRI, PROPERTY 366 (3d ed. 1993).
114. William A. Reppy, Jr., Acquisition with a Mix of Community and Separate Funds:
Displacing California's Presumaion of Gift by Recognizing Shared Ownership or a Right of
Reimbursement. 31 IDAHO L REV. 965,973-74 (1995).
115. See Bartke, supra note 15, at 385 (describing the primary approaches taken by
community property jurisdictions to resolve the inception of title problem: a doctrine of
reimbursement, or the construction of equitable liens favoring the community).
116. See id.
117. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70,76 (Me. 1979).
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But where certain common facts are present, the source of funds rule
is a poor vehicle for achieving an equitable division of property. These
facts are three in number. the marriage is of significant duration; the
joint property at issue is the most valuable asset the couple owns
(typically the marital residence); and a majority of the funds used for its
acquisition have their source in the non-marital property of one
spouse."' Cases presenting these facts highlight the inherent conflict in
the two basic principles of the partnership conception of marriage: on
the one hand, "the community is entitled to all the fruits of the labor and
efforts of both spouses" while, on the other hand, "the separate property
of the spouses continues ... so long as it can be identified."I t In such
cases, the formulaic application of the source of funds rule works poorly
because it can deprive the marital estate of the opportunity to recover the
fair value of its contributions of labor as well as payments for main-
tenance, taxes, and the like. One basic assumption is that the value of
the spouses' combined labor and financial contributions exceeds the
value of their enjoyment in the property during the marriage. Another
assumption is that the spouse benefited by the strict application of the
source of funds rule has also been benefited over the years by the
partner's labor contributions and expenditures of resources, all of which
could have been expended by the partner toward other, equity-building
activities. Where the primary contributions of the disadvantaged partner
were made as a homemaker, the opportunity costs are most severe. Such
a spouse has not only failed to build capital equity, but has also failed,
more often than not, to develop skills and experience transferable to the
workplace. In contrast, the. wage-earning spouse has maintained not
only a capital investment during the marriage but also a career, both with
the aid of his or her partner.' In order to arrive at an equitable
118. See GLENDON, supra note 16, at 234. Professor Glendon observes that most divorces
involve younger couples with minor children and that young couples "tyically have few assets
oththanthe yl lngwhich may be leased, mortgaged, or owted." Id. In respone, mast
Western nations have deeloped 'miin-regimes" of marital property addressed o!ly to the
treatment of the marital residence and household goods. See id. "One way or another, courts
erywher- with more or less aid from legislation, eadeavor to preserve the marital home or its use
for the needed period of time for the custodial spouse and childrcn." I For a Large number of
other individuals, "government entitlements and job-related rights such as salaries, pensions.
insurance, and other benefits have become more important than land...." Id. at 135.
119. Bartkesupra note 15, at383.
120. rTloday more and more of our ialth takis the fom of rights or stats rather than
of tangible goods. An individual's profession or occupation is a prime eample. To
many others, a job with a particular employer is the principal form of wealth. A
profession or ajob is frequently far mare valuable than a house or bank account, for a
new house can be bought, afid a new bank created, once a professionor job is secure.
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Y ME L. 733,738 (1964). A 1987 article notes that
"[tihe first empirical study of the effects of introducing increased autonomy in collection and
spending of income has concluded that such rules regularly disadvantage the economically weaker
spouse." GLENDON, supra note 16, at 134 n.147 (citing Monique Coss et aL. (In)Equahty of
Husband and Wife in Patrimonial Matters: An Empirical Investigation of tie Effects of a
Progressive Matrinonial Law in Belgium, 15 INT'L I. Soc. L 29 (1987)).
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resolution in a case characterized by these facts, a divorce court must
have more flexibility than the source of funds rule provides.
D. Including in the Marital Estate All Contributions
toward Joint Property
Subsection 3 of the Maine Marital Property Act provides: "All
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior
to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property
regardless of... title .... ,,2 Where one spouse becomes a joint tenant
during marriage, whether with a third party or with his or her marital
partner, it seems obvious that that spouse has "acquired" ownership in
property. What that property is is most fundamentally a function of what
rights the owner has acquired over the property. Where a person has no
rights in a thing, that thing is not the person's property. Conversely,
rights in a thing imply ownership, exclusive or shared. The law makes
it clear that the joint tenant acquires immediate rights in joint property
upon transfer, one of which is to dispose of those rights by conveying
them to another. " Where the spouse has realized the power to dispose
.of property, will it not be said that he or she has acquired ownership over
that property? And by extension, if the spouse has acquired property,
must it not be recognized as marital property because it was
"acquired... subsequent to marriage"?" And yet the history of the
Law Court's treatment of this statute, until Long, has been that the
exception of subsection 2(B) swallows the rule of inclusion of
subsection 3.
With Long, the consensus has come to be not that one subsection is
manifestly of greater weight but that, as first propounded by Justice
Harry Glassman: "'[lit is fruitless to endeavor to determine the meaning
of subsections 2 and 3 ... by a mere textual analysis.""' Whether or
not the statute truly sheds no light, including all contributions toward the
acquisition of joint property in the marital estate is the appropriate
method for handling the disposition of such property at divorce. In the
first place, such an arrangement is consistent with the manner in which
the private parties chose to arrange ownership during marriage. They
chose, basically, to share ownership." Where it can be shown to the
121. ME.REv.STAT.ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(1) (West 1998).
122. See Long v.Long, 1997ME171,116,697A.2d 1317.
123. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(2).
124. See Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171,115,697 A.2d at 1323 (quoting Grant v. Grant. 424
A.2d 139, 144 (Me. 1981) (Glassman J., concurring)).
125. Noting a 1961 law review article which presents a contemporaneous study showing over
85% of all deeds of real property to husbands and wives were in joint tenancy, one commentator
writes that "the usual manner of taking title to real property in California by husband and wife is
injoint tenancy, for reasons apparently quite distinct from the legal incidents of such ownership."
See Donald C. Knutsen, California Community Property Laws: A Pleafor Legislative Study and
Reform, 39 S. CAL L REV. 240, at 253-54 (1966) (noting Yale B. Griffith, Community Property
in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L REV. 87,88 (1961)).
[Vol. 50:471
REAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
court that the intention of the parties was contrary to the presumption,
it can be rebutted. This result conforms with the statutory grant of
power giving spouses the freedom to make private arrangements and
enter into contracts with one another with respect to the disposition of
property at divorce.'2 Additionally, the flexibility of the Long rule
allows the divorce court to reimburse contributions of non-marital
property toward joint property in those circumstances where it is
warranted, as in very brief marriages where the contributing spouse
relied on assurances that the marriage would endure.' Finally, the
extension of the divorce courts' authority under Long conforms with the
partnership theory of marriage adopted by the drafters of both the
Uniform Act and the Maine Act, who intended that the partners in
marriage be understood as a single economic unit rather than as
independent economic actors.'
V. LEGLATE COMiENDATION
The Long court's judicially-crafted presumption thatjoint property is
marital property provides a useful construction of subsections 2 and 3 of
The major reason that marital property is take injoint tenancy ... is that real estate
salemen and brokers generally recommend this title form as the Iast expensive. Som
cases suggest that there are reasons othe than the layman's lack of namress of the
legal significance of the form or character of title (such as] wher (n] husband
successfully testifiefs] that joint tenancy was "forced upon him against his will by the
banks, title compani, or other parties to the transactions."
Id. at 254 n.98 (citing Jones v. Jones, 286 P.2d 908, 913 (Cal. 1955)). See gemrally Griffith,
As Professor Glendon has char=cd the problem:
[U]n the course of living together, husbands and wie jointly acquire assets, makegila
to each other, and use many items in common-all in serene disregard of such notions
as title and without keeping track of the precise contributions each has made. Thus
considerable uncertainty surounds thbe onership rights of the spouses during mariage.
GLENDON, spra note 16, at 125.
126. See ME. REv. SrAT. AxN. tit. 19-A, § 953(2)(D).
127. See Long v. Long. 1997 ME 171.1 16.697 A.2d at 1324.
128. See Comment, supra note 15, at 339.
The law used to bein the case of a divorce: that the wife was entitled to one-third of dhe
husband's estate as far as real estate is concerned. We know that in the mDde society
this is not a fair distribution because in many cases the woman works and she has
contributed fully as much to the estate as has the husband. So what this law does is that
it assumes that, unlss evidence is introduced to the contrary, that the property which
the couple accumulated during their marriage is joint property and should be divid:d
equally.
2 Legis. Rec. 3410 (1971) (statement of Sen. Harding, before the State Senate).
Senator Harding was wr ng onftwo counts: the presumption is that property is marital property.
notjointprOperty, and that it should be divided equitably, not equally. If the presumption v-em for
joint property, then each spouse would have an equal interest and the divore court would be
required to divide it equally. Howev er, the statute provides for equitable division of naitafl
property, which need not result in even division. See h. RE V. STAT. ANN tiL 19-A, § 953(l)
(requiring that "the court shall set apart to each spouse the spouse's property and sha divide the
marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors").
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the Maine Act and promises divorcing spouses that the division of their
joint property will be governed by equitable considerations aimed at
recovering for each party his or her fair share of an asset's value. In the
interest of clarity the Legislature should revise the Act to incorporate
this presumption. Presumably, such an amendment would be made to
that part of the marital property definition found in subsection 2(B).
Onto the current language that excludes from the marital property
definition "[p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior
to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise or descent,"'" should be appended "unless such property is held
by the spouses as joint tenants."
While this terse amendment to the statute would greatly clarify the
interplay of subsections 2 and 3, the fundamental question would still
remain as to whether the current statutory scheme adequately protects
the foremost interest of the marital estate. As discussed in Part V.C.,
the operation of the current law can in certain cases undercut the ability
of the marital estate to recoup its true investment in the marital
partnership. This is in part due to the fact that the setting aside of the
separate property mandated by subsection 1 potentially removes the vast
majority of the assets from the equitable discretion of the judge. 3 With
fewer assets available for the judge to divide along just or equitable
lines, there is less ability to redress inequitable circumstances through
the disposition of property. But more important, this problem is due,
once again, to the poor definition of marital property found in subsection
2. Ideally, section 953 should provide a method for measuring the fair
monetary interest of the marital estate in the gross estate (the marital
estate plus the combined separate estates) that does not treat the marital
estate as a remainder interest. In other words, the determination of the
value of the marital estate should be the primary task for the court. The
setting aside of separate property should occur secondarily, only after
the objective value of the marital estate has been determined.
Otherwise, as is the case under the current statutory scheme, the marital
estate is only a remainder interest.
To prevent the marital estate, which is the preferred estate under the
partnership concept of marriage, from being disenfranchised in those
circumstances where one spouse's separate property comprises the
majority of the gross estate, the law should require that the value of the
marital estate be established prior to tracing and setting aside separate
property. In other words, the value of the marital estate should be
established positively rather than negatively. Would its value differ if
it were established in this manner rather than as a remainder? Yes. The
value arrived at in this manner would differ from the remainder value
currently arrived at under Maine law because it would require the court
to determine, among other things, the value added to the separate estates
129. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(2)(B) (West 1998).
130. See id. § 953(1).
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through contributions of marital time, labor, and assets in the form of
maintenance, improvements, modifications, and the like.
To illustrate how this approach would differ in result from the current
operation of section 953, consider an asset such as a summer cottage
brought into a marriage by the wife which is owned by her separately
and free of any obligation on the purchase price. Over the years marital
funds are expended on upkeep, landscaping, taxes, utilities, and
advertisements for summer rentals. Initially, tenants are few and far
between. By the time of the divorce, however, every week of the
summer is reserved and the property is bringing in several thousand
dollars in annual rents. In addition to this income realization, the market
value of the cottage has increased significantly. Will this increase in
value be treated under the current system as partially owned by the
marital estate? Not necessarily. Under the current system, the cottage
would be set aside as the separate property of the wife. Only if the
marital estate were valuable enough could the marital estate be
reimbursed at the time of divorce. On the other hand, a system that
addressed the interest of the marital estate prior to setting aside the
separate estates would have to determine exactly what portion of the
value of the cottage was the product of contributions made with marital
funds and marital labor. By recognizing the stake of the marital
partnership in the cottage, as distinct from the individual partners, the
value of the marital estate is enhanced and more property is available for
the court to dispose of along equitable lines. In other words, the current
system of property disposition fails to assess adequately th6 real
economic value of the marital estate. This is due to the fact that the
current method of disposition treats the marital estate as a residuary
interest and not as the primary interest.
The remaining questions, then, are how the true value of the marital
estate ought to be determined and, once it has been determined, how the
marital estate ought to be divided. How the marital estate is to be valued
will depend on how the marital estate is defined. The negative definition
of marital property found in subsection 953(2), that marital property is
"all property acquired... during the marriage, except' '13 the enumerated
classes of separate property, should be discarded. The marital estate
should, instead, be positively defined. One possible definition might be
"all property acquired by the marital partners during marriage, including
property held jointly by the spouses and all increase in value during the
marriage of both the marital property and the separate property of the
spouses." Such a definition would surely be in harmony with the par-
tnership theory of marriage and the conception of the marital partners as
engaged in a single economic endeavor, assuming that these character-
izations are desirable ones. The value of the marital estate could be
determined in different ways. It could be arrived at very generally by
subtracting the value of the gross estate at the time of marriage from the
131. Id § 953(2).
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value of the gross estate at the time of divorce. Alternatively, the value
of the overall marital estate could be obtained by determining the sum
of its ownership interests in the individual assets and liabilities of the
partners. As for the division of the marital estate between the partners,
there is really no reason why it would not remain a function of the
court's equitable discretion. One possible alternative, much simpler to
apply, would be to divide the marital estate in half." Once the
disposition of the marital estate is resolved, the court would be free to
set aside the remainder of the separate estates to the separate parties.
The greatest strength to an approach such as this is that it recognizes
what is objectively the case: over time contributions of marital assets do
inure to the benefit of the separate property holdings of each spouse.
This accession to the value of the separate property should be recognized
in the form of a buy-in to title on the part of the marital partnership.
Because such an approach requires consideration of the impact of time
and maintenance upon the value of assets, it provides a more objective
and fair approximation of the marital portion of spouses' gross estate.
Marriages of short duration will yield relatively smaller stakes in the
separate holdings of the spouses, while marriages of great duration will
yield more considerable equity positions. By addressing the valuation
problem inherent in the marital estate prior to the set aside of separate
property, the court will gain equitable discretion over a larger piece of
the overall estate held by the spouses. This would enable the court to
better address whatever equitable considerations or extraordinary
circumstances may arise and, accordingly, achieve a more "just"
disposition.
Marc J. Veilleux
132. This approach resembles the system at work in the German Zugewinn. See GLENDON,
supra note 16, at 133. The Zugewinn is the increase of the monetary value of the spouses' estates
that occurs during marriage. In Germany "[tihe increase, if any, of one spouse's estate is compared
with the increase, if any, of the estate of the other. A partner whose increase is greater than the
other's must pay to the other one-half the difference." Id
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